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INTRODUCTION: FOUR FOR THE PRICE OF ONE
This essay originally started out as a review of Charles
Abernathy's casebook, Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation,1
which I am currently using to teach my "Civil Rights Litigation"
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1992).
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course at the University of Baltimore. Since at some point in my
career I have used three of the four major casebooks available to
law faculty teaching Civil Rights (the Abernathy casebook,
Eisenberg's Civil Rights Legislation,2 and Low and Jeffries' Civil
Rights Actions)3 , I decided to extend the review to all four
books.4 All four are quite good, including the newest, Nahmod,
Wells & Eaton's Constitutional Torts, which I haven't had a
chance to use.' They all differ, however, in coverage and focus,
and these differences might lead a professor to choose one or the
other, depending on the type of Civil Rights course one wants to
teach. My hope is that this essay may prove helpful to someone
choosing a casebook for such a course.
I will first discuss the nature of the Civil Rights course, as
I teach it and as I believe it is taught at many law schools.
Next, I will compare the general suitability of each of the four
texts for various kinds of Civil Rights courses. Then I will
discuss the Abernathy book, which I currently use, examining
both its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, I will describe what
I think are the advantages offered by each of the other three
texts.
WHAT'S IN A NAME?
When a member of the Seattle University Law Review staff
called last spring asking me to write a review of the Abernathy
casebook for their Constitutional Law Casebook Review, I gave
her the same caveat that I have given to students over the years
who have expressed an interest in taking my Civil Rights class.
The Abernathy book is not strictly a Constitutional Law
casebook, and my Civil Rights class, in which I use that book,
is not really about substantive constitutional rights.
2. THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1996).
3. PETER Low & JOHN JEFFRIES, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS (2d ed. 1994).
4. I am currently using the second edition of Abernathy for the third time in three years
(fall '95, fall '96, and fall '97). I used the current second edition of Low and Jeffries in spring
'95 and the first edition of that book in summer '90. I used the previous first and second editions
of Eisenberg several times in the nineteen-eighties. Obviously, since my familiarity with
Abernathy is greater and more current, I will have more to say about it than the other texts.
After this article was written but before it was published, a new casebook in this area became
available. Because of the timing, it was not reviewed. See ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON & IVAN
E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION (1997).
5. SHELDON NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (1995).
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If one uses the term "civil rights" with a member of the
public, or most second-year law students, they probably think of
a number of personal rights (such as freedom of speech and
religion or freedom from discrimination) which are protected in
the United States primarily by the Constitution. Those of us
who teach in the field might be more likely to use the term "civil
liberties" to describe such substantive constitutional rights.6 A
student who is interested in this area would be advised to take a
course such as one offered at my law school by another professor
entitled "Civil Liberties Seminar."
Classes denominated as "Civil Rights" classes are more
likely to focus on federal statutes passed both to enforce and to
extend these substantive constitutional rights. To be sure,
constitutional issues crop up frequently in a Civil Rights course.
The interplay between the Constitution and various civil rights
statutes is one of the more interesting aspects of such a course.
Several years ago, in an attempt to clarify the substance of what
I teach, I renamed the current version of my course "Civil Rights
Litigation." Similarly, Professor Abernathy changed the title of
his textbook from Civil Rights to Civil Rights and Constitutional
Litigation when the second edition was released.7 All four of the
books reviewed here focus more on the process of enforcing
constitutional and related rights, rather than on defining the
rights themselves.
6. I am not saying that it would be incorrect to use the term "civil rights" to describe a
group of rights, some of which are constitutionally based. Black's Law Dictionary, in fact, defines
"civil liberties" as "Personal, natural rights guaranteed and protected by Constitution" (emphasis
added). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990). It does not contain a definition of
"civil rights," rather only one for "Civil Rights Acts," which it defines as "Federal statutes
enacted after Civil War, and more recently in 1957 and 1964, intended to implement and give
further force to basic personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. So it would be
perfectly correct to use the term "civil rights" to describe personal rights, some of which are
guaranteed by the Constitution and some by statute.
I am merely pointing out that as law school terms of art, the distinction is usually made
between Civil Liberties books and courses, which comprehend the study of substantive
constitutional rights, and Civil Rights books and courses, which describe the enforcement
mechanisms for such civil liberties, or the study of statutorily created rights and their
enforcement, or sometimes both.
7. ABERNATHY, supra note 1.
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SCOPE OF THE COURSE: OLD RIGHTS AND/OR NEW?
There are two distinct sets of federal civil rights statutes.
The first set was passed during the Reconstruction Era shortly
after the Civil War. One of the keystones of this legislative era
was Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter Section 1983). Since its
resurrection by the Supreme Court in 1961,' Section 1983 has
been the primary method of enforcing constitutional rights and
redressing constitutional violations committed by state and local
governments and their employees. 9
The study of this statute, and its interpretation by numerous
Supreme Court opinions since 1960, is the major focus of my
Civil Rights Litigation course, as well as, I suspect, the majority
of similarly named law school courses. ° If I wanted to be even
more accurate, I might have to name the course "Constitutional
8. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960), is the seminal case for modem § 1983
jurisprudence. It made clear that persons whose constitutional rights had been violated by local
governmental officials could recover damages, even if those officials had exceeded their authority
under state law. Monroe v. Pape is the first case presented in three of the four books reviewed
here (in Eisenberg it is preceded by an extensive historical review of the history of civil rights
legislation in the U.S.).
9. Section 1983 may also be used to remedy violations of federal statutory law, Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), although not in all instances. See Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
10. My course always exceeds the scope of § 1983 in one regard, as do all four textbooks
under consideration and, I suspect, all similar law school courses. Suits against federal officials
for violations of constitutional rights do not fall within the ambit of § 1983, since such officials
are not acting "under color of" state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The Supreme Court has
judicially created a similar remedy against federal officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1988). The two remedies are treated so
similarly in many, though not all, respects that it makes sense to study the two remedies together.
In fact, it is impossible to study § 1983 jurisprudence without reading at least some Bivens cases,
since the Court sometimes changes § 1983 law in a Bivens case. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982) (change in qualified immunity announced in Bivens case but explicitly made
applicable to § 1983 suits).
My course also exceeds the scope of § 1983 by covering several other civil rights statutes
passed during the reconstruction, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985(3). These statutes are
fundamentally different from § 1983 in that they prohibit and remedy private discrimination.
Theoretically, they have no place in a course dedicated to constitutional litigation, but they are
often dealt with along with § 1983. Three of the four casebooks under consideration provide
significant coverage of these statutes; only Nahmod, which is specifically focused on § 1983
jurisprudence, does not. Unlike Bivens suits, which must be taught along with § 1983, these
statutes, although historically linked with § 1983, are different enough to be omitted from a Civil
Rights course focused on § 1983 and constitutional litigation.
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Litigation," or perhaps "Constitutional Torts."'" Approximate-
ly the first half of the Abernathy casebook is devoted to Section
1983,12 and this constitutes the bulk of the reading assignments
I give my class. This material also constitutes approximately
half of Eisenberg, most of Low and Jeffries, and all of Nahmod
et al.' 3
The other set of federal civil rights statutes were passed
mostly in the 1960s, to prohibit, among other things, racial
discrimination in public accommodations, 4 in housing,5 in
employment,'" in federally assisted programs,' 7 and in vot-
ing.'8  These statutes comprise the second half of the Aber-
nathy and Eisenberg casebooks,' 9 but are not covered in the
other two books. I do not cover any of this material in my
course, from lack of both time and personal expertise. Aber-
nathy is correct in stating that adding coverage of some of the
more recent statutes gives students a fuller understanding of the
whole picture of civil rights law, especially "the fascinating
interplay between statutory sources of civil rights law and
constitutional sources."2 °  To teach all of this material in one
11. The difference between these two names would depend on whether the course focuses
exclusively on § 1983 damage actions, as does Nahmod (hence the textbook's name: Constitutional
Torts), or whether the course also includes coverage of issues that arise in injunctive, or structural
reform, litigation. Each of the other three books provide some coverage of such issues, but only
Low and Jeffries provide an entire chapter dedicated to structural reform litigation.
12. ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 1-355.
13. EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 3-703; LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 1-300 and 449-
928; NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-431.
14. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
15. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq. (1994).
16. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
17. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
18. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
19. Eisenberg does not cover discrimination in public accommodations, but does have a
chapter on law protecting the handicapped.
20. In suggesting the benefits of teaching the book as a whole, as opposed to only the
Section 1983 material (which he also lists as a possible "self-contained course"), Abernathy states:
First, the book as a whole offers broad coverage of the main themes of all major civil
rights legislation, allowing students to see the connection between judicially developed
themes and legislatively developed themes, for example, the difference between the
intent test for racial discrimination in § 1983 cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment
and the impact and intent tests for racial discrimination used under Title VII as well as
the Voting Rights Act. The fuller picture also gives the student a more reassuring
knowledge of how civil rights laws fit together as a whole to accomplish more finely
detailed or sophisticated solutions: if § 1983's "under color of law" test does not reach
all discrimination, it can be supplemented by legislation such as Title VI or the
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semester, however, as he apparently has done on a number of
occasions," seems quite daunting to me. I have instead accept-
ed his more modest proposal to teach the first half of the book
as "a self-contained course in constitutional litigation ...
[slometimes called 'constitutional torts'."22 There is plenty of
material here to occupy a semester.
At the time the first editions of Abernathy, as well as
Eisenberg, were published, 23 it was important that the newer
statutory materials be included. This was because the material
was hard to find in other casebooks, and most law schools had
only one or two civil rights courses. Now most law schools have
separate classes for Employment Discrimination Law, Disability
Discrimination Law, Race and the Law, Women's
Rights/Gender Discrimination, etc.,24 and there are complete
casebooks devoted to these more specialized areas of civil
rights.25
For those faculty wishing to teach a Constitutional Litigation
course, any of the four books under consideration will do. If
they wish to teach a broader course including some of the
Rehabilitation Act.
ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at v.
21. "1 have five times taught almost the entire set of materials to dedicated-and challenged-
classes at Georgetown, usually for only two credits." ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at x.
22. Id. at v.
23. In 1980 and 1981, respectively.
24. Other civil rights and civil liberties courses currently taught at my law school include:
Civil Liberties Seminar, Employment Discrimination Law, Gender and the Law, Law and
Disabilities Seminar, Law and Social Reform Seminar, Legal Rights of the Elderly, Race and the
Law, and Sexual Orientation and the Law. University of Baltimore School of Law Catalogue,
1997-98.
25. A partial listing of casebooks suitable for teaching in these areas includes:
Employment Discrimination: JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDLER & DARRYL J. STRICKLER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1993); JAMES E. JONES
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (5th ed. 1987);
ARTHUR B. SMITH ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (4th
ed. 1994); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1994).
Gender Discrimination: MARY JOE FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1992); HERMAN HILL
KAY, TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1988).
Disability Law: LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS
(1995), MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY (1994).
Race and the Law: DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed.
1992).
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modern statutes, they would be limited to Abernathy and
Eisenberg.
GETTING DOWN TO THE REAL NITTY GRITTY
For several reasons, the remainder of this review will focus
on the use of the four casebooks for the narrower Constitutional
Litigation course. First of all, I have greater familiarity with this
kind of course, since it is the one I teach. Secondly, I believe it
is the course that would be taught by the majority of other
faculty who would use one of these books. And finally, since all
four of the books cover this material, it makes for an easier, fairer
comparison among them.
Size Does Matter
Before I get on to what I perceive are the more substantive
differences among the four books, I think it important to talk
about size: number of cases and pages. While this may seem
like a mundane matter, it can make an important difference in
how the class is taught by the professor and received by the
students. Basically, the distinction in length of the material
breaks down to this: Low and Jeffries and Eisenberg devote
significantly more pages to this material than do Abernathy and
Nahmod. In fact, the former two casebooks devote nearly twice
the space for this material than Abernathy or Nahmod6
Obviously, there are advantages and disadvantages to both
approaches, depending on how you like to teach the course.
Several years ago, I switched from using Low and Jeffries to
Abernathy in part because it was more compact. This com-
pactness is accomplished in two ways: it has the shortest average
length for the edited version of the main cases27 and the least
26. For the page length comparisons, I have included all the material that relates to § 1983
litigation (including Bivens actions (see supra note 11) and all issues that would arise in such
actions (i.e., Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, special problems involved in equitable relief,
etc.). Low & Jeffries devote 779 pages to these topics, Eisenberg 690, Nahmod 431, and
Abernathy 383.
27. In Abernathy, 48 cases take approximately 260 pages, an average of a little more than
5 pages per case. Nahmod's page length is approximately the same, while Low and Jeffries, at
15 pages per case, and Eisenberg, at about 9, use significantly longer versions.
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amount of noncase material (notes and questions).28 When I
taught the course previously, using Eisenberg or Low and
Jeffries, I perceived the students to be somewhat overwhelmed
by the amount and detail of the material. With Abernathy, I
can assign approximately two main cases, which average only five
or six pages each, plus a page or two of notes for each.2 9 I find
the students come to class more familiar with the facts and law
of the cases, which allows me to conduct a better discussion of
the major issues involved.
There is a cost to this leaner approach, however. First, stu-
dents are not forced to practice the fine art of gleaning the
meaning from long and complex Supreme Court opinions and
dissents. Teachers who see that as an important aspect of this
course might be better off with Low and Jeffries or Eisenberg,
which provide longer excerpts.3 °
Second, while Abernathy provides material for discussion of
most of the important legal issues in this area, it does not give
the students as full a picture of the development and current
status of the law. While Abernathy is a very good teaching tool,
a student who actually had read and understood all or most of
one of the other books would be more knowledgeable about the
field. I myself sometimes turn to my desk copy of one of the
other books when looking for the answer to a student's ques-
tion.3
28. Approximately 122 pages, compared to 135 for Eisenberg, 149 for Nahmod, and 183
for Low & Jeffries.
29. For example, the material on qualified immunity from damages is made up of two main
cases of 6 and 5 pages, respectively (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335 (1986)), plus 5 pages of notes, for a total of 16 pages. ABERNATHY, supra note 1,
at 149-65. By comparison, the material on qualified immunity in Low & Jeffries comprises 54
pages. Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 43-96.
30. There are some faculty who prefer totally unedited versions of the cases for this reason.
Such faculty will have to copy their own material and will also, I suspect, have to deal with some
undeserved and unenlightened student resentment. I used to teach an upper-level course in
Federal Jurisdiction using the Low and Jeffries Federal Courts casebook, which, like its sister
Civil Rights casebook, is composed mostly of comparatively long excerpts from Supreme Court
cases. I once had a student come up to me at the end of the semester and tell me how much he
had liked the course, except for having to read those "long difficult Supreme Court cases," and
asking whether I couldn't teach the course without them.
31. Again, using qualified immunity as an example, while Abernathy's 16 pages works well
for a one-hour class discussion of the doctrine, the 54 pages in Low & Jeffries would be more
useful for in-depth research.
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These Are a Few of My Favorite Things
As mentioned above, what most attracted me to the
Abernathy text was my perception that it gave the students
enough information to discuss the important issues raised in
constitutional tort cases without overwhelming them with too
much detail. There are other reasons why I chose it.
I particularly like the second subchapter, right after the
introductory material on Monroe v. Pape, which is entitled "Ele-
ments of a Plaintiffs § 1983 Claim - Deprivations of Constitu-
tional Rights."32  The introductory cases first establish the
proposition that there is no single standard of care for all Section
1983 cases, but that it will vary depending on the specific
constitutional right being enforced.33 The book then sets out
examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has established
the state-of-mind/standard-of-care element for each of four of
the most important categories of Section 1983 cases: due
process, 34 prisoners' rights,35 police misconduct, 36 and racial
discrimination.37 I find this grounding in the substantive rights
most often enforced through Section 1983 litigation very helpful
to the students, before launching them off into the less familiar
and more difficult territories of constitutional litigation, such as
individual and governmental liability, sovereign immunity,
abstention doctrines, and the like. The substantive rights
grounding provides a link to, and review of, constitutional law
doctrines which the students should already have studied,38
32. ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 27-89.
33. Id. at 22-33. The main Supreme Court case that settled this issue is Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
34. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1996); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 27-28.
35. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Whitely v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). ABER-
NATHY, supra note 1, at 33-48.
36. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 48-65.
37. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, affd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1971);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 75-89.
38. Although I do make some exceptions, our required course in Constitutional Law is a
prerequisite for Civil Rights Litigation.
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while offering some concrete examples of civil rights cases which
I can refer back to at other points in the course.39
Take Note
Another aspect of Abernathy that I like is that many of the
notes and questions following the cases focus on the theme of the
difficulty in construing a statute such as Section 1983. These
notes were very helpful to my understanding of the Supreme
Court's vacillation between treating Section 1983 cases as matters
of constitutional versus statutory interpretation. A number of
factors lead to this ambivalence by the Court. First, Section
1983 is sparsely written; it is more like a constitutional provision
than the typical modern statute.g Second, its statutory history
is often inconclusive, since it is more than one hundred years old
and was directed almost exclusively to racial discrimination,
which constitutes only a fraction of the Section 1983 cases
today.4' Third, the interpretations of Section 1983 are often
intertwined with, and affected by, the substantive constitutional
rights being enforced. 2 Finally, Section 1983 cases often affect
the sensitive balance of federal-state relations.
39. Of the other three texts, the one that comes closest to covering this as broadly and, for
my purposes, as usefully as Abernathy is Nahmod. NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 111-44.
Low & Jeffries cover this material later in their book. LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 187-236.
40. Section 1983 consists of only one sentence:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
41. For example, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961), the Court interpreted
the statutory history of § 1983 as showing Congressional intent not to hold municipalities liable
under the act. Just seventeen years later, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 689-94 (1978), the Court reinterpreted the same history to determine
that municipalities could be sued.
42. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986) (holding that § 1983 did not
contain a single state-of-mind requirement, but that this would vary depending on what
constitutional remedy was being enforced); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
66-7, 71 (1989) (holding that § 1983 plaintiffs could not get around the 11th amendment bar to
suing a state in federal court by bringing suit in state court: "[Iln deciphering congressional
intent as to the scope of § 1983, the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we
decline to adopt a reading of § 1983 that disregards it.").
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On the Other Hand...
While I have found Abernathy's notes and questions helpful
in developing my approach to the course, the students find them
less helpful. The notes raise many difficult questions, often one
after another, without providing many answers. Students have
reported finding this frustrating, and it is clear to me that many
of them eventually stop reading the notes unless I specifically call
a particular one to their attention. While this is certainly an area
where it makes sense to ask students to grapple with difficult and
often unanswerable questions, I can understand their frustration
at being bombarded with one after another.43 Interestingly,
they also have complained of exactly the opposite problem with
many other note questions: the notes so clearly suggest one
correct answer that they appear to be merely a disingenuous way
of making a point.
The notes in Low and Jeffries are very different from those
in Abernathy, and in fact quite different from those in most
casebooks I have used. In addition to being longer than most,
the notes are more substantive and textual. Rather than raising
questions for the students to ponder, they provide a lot of
information in a very straightforward manner. Instead of putting
most of the notes only after the main cases, the authors use long
explanatory notes both to set the stage for the main cases and to
follow the course of the law after them.44
I first became familiar with Low and Jeffries' approach when
I used their similarly structured Federal Courts casebook to teach
a Federal Jurisdiction course.4" I switched to their casebook in
that course from a casebook structured similarly to Abernathy
(i.e., main cases not preceded by explanatory notes, with the
notes to be read by the students after the cases), largely because
43. 1 think the students have a point here. For example, one note that I chose at random,
a two-and-a-half page "Note on Sources of and Limits on Official Immunities," contains thirty
questions, most of them either rhetorical or unanswerable. ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 139-41.
44. See, e.g., LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 57-67 (introductory notes on the qualified
immunity defense, which precede the main case of Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)),
and Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 81-89 (notes following Anderson).
45. PETER Low & JOHN JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS (3d ed. 1994).
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of the detailed, explanatory nature of the notes.46 Many of the
Federal Jurisdiction cases are harder for the students to under-
stand than the Civil Rights cases, and I was hoping that the
introductory textual material would aid the students in their
understanding of the cases. I don't think it's quite as hard for
students to grasp the issues in the Civil Rights cases, and
therefore I switched back to the leaner approach of Abernathy
for this course.
Because of the large amount of material Low and Jeffries
provides, including lists of relevant law review articles on each
topic, I think it would be particularly well suited to a class in
which students write a paper, rather than take an exam. The
students might not be expected to read all of the explanatory
notes for each topic, but the information would be easily
available to get them started on a more in-depth look at a
particular area.
Nahmod et al seems to take an intermediate approach. The
authors do provide textual, explanatory notes before the main
cases (although a good deal more truncated than Low and
Jeffries), and they also include the kind of thought provoking
notes after the case as in Abernathy, but again shorter and more
focused.47 I think this might be a good compromise that could
work well.
Eisenberg also relies mostly on post-main-case notes that
both raise questions and provide information, but also includes
some limited introductory material before some cases.4"
If You Want to Know What Really Bugs Me...
My biggest criticism of Abernathy is that the current
(second) edition is now more than five years old, and there is no
46. DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS, (3rd. ed. 1982).
47. For example, in their presentation on absolute judicial immunity, the authors begin with
two pages of background and history, then present the main case of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978), and end with a short series of questions about Stump. NAHMOD ET AL., supra note
5, at 233-39.
48. In Eisenberg's treatment of Stump and judicial immunity, the author precedes the case
with a two-page background informational note and follows the case with a four page note that
both describes additional cases and asks questions about both Stump and these other cases.
EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 219-31.
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supplement available.4 9 Compare this to Nahmod, ° which is
only a few years old, Eisenberg,5 which just last year came out
with its fourth edition (and which, in the past, has been regularly
supplemented), and Low and Jeffries, 2 which although three
years old comes out with a very comprehensive supplement every
year. Section 1983 jurisprudence is an area that regularly
produces several important Supreme Court cases each year, and
a supplement is a much more convenient way of keeping the
course up to date than having to edit and copy new cases for the
students. When I asked a West Publishing representative several
years ago whether a supplement or new edition of Abernathy was
in the works, she said there was not, because the small number
of books sold each year did not justify the expense. It is
certainly true that here at the University of Baltimore we order
only ten to twenty Civil Rights textbooks, compared with three
hundred for each first year subject. Up until now, I have been
willing to work around the fact that Abernathy gets a little more
out of date each year; but at a certain point this might be a
factor that might lead me to switch, or someone else to adopt, a
different book.
Giving Credit Vhere Credit Is Due
There is general agreement about main cases to include in
a Civil Rights course or casebook. Almost all of these are
Supreme Court cases since 1960. While the choice of main cases
in the four texts is not identical, there is a very large overlap. I
have already discussed many of the differences in the four
casebooks, including length of the material, length of the main
case excerpts, extent of the coverage outside of Section 1983, and
length, style, and focus of the notes accompanying the text. I
have also already explained what I particularly like about
Abernathy. There are aspects to each of the texts which I like,
and which I think distinguish it somewhat from the others.
49. The second edition of Abernathy was published in 1992.
50. NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 5.
51. EISENBERG, supra note 2.
52. Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 3.
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Eisenberg
As previously noted, Eisenberg is probably the most
comprehensive of the four books, giving extensive coverage both
to the newer and older civil rights statutes.53 Additionally, it
contains some useful textual material that the others do not.
The book begins with an extensive section on the historical
background of civil rights law, beginning with the end of the
Civil War, the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and tracing the
restrictive interpretations of that law through the years.54 This
is very helpful in setting the stage for Monroe v. Pape, which is
where the other books begin.55 For a professor with the time
and interest to cover it, this material could be very helpful in
putting the more modern cases in context. It is, however, long
and difficult material, for which not all classes might have the
patience.
The book also contains more extensive practical information
about the number, nature, and effects of different kinds of civil
rights cases. Two particularly good sections5 6 examine research
conducted by Eisenberg himself and others into the reality of the
perception, by the Supreme Court and others, that "§ 1983 suits
were engulfing the federal courts."5 7  Law students are rarely
exposed to this kind of empirical research, and I believe that
many would find it interesting and helpful.
Low and Jeffries
The most distinguishing characteristic of Low and Jeffries,
as noted above, is that it provides the most comprehensive cover-
age of Section 1983 jurisprudence. 8 It has longer case excerpts,
and longer, more detailed notes containing a huge amount of
53. EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 3-64.
54. Id.
55. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
56. See EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 180-91 (The Reality of Constitutional Tort Claims)
and 532-42 (The Flood of Federal Court Prisoner Cases).
57. Id. at 532 (quoting Eastman, Draining the Swamp: An Examination of Judicial and
Congressional Policies Designed to Limit Prisoner Litigation, 20 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 61,
71 (1988)).
58. LOW AND JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 1-299.
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information which is presented in a straightforward way that
makes the text reasonably manageable.
Low and Jeffries' Civil Rights casebook is an offshoot of,
and companion to, their earlier text, Federal Courts and the Law
of Federal-State Relations.9 While all four books under review
here necessarily treat the problems of federalism and federal-state
relations that inevitably arise in Section 1983 jurisprudence, Low
and Jeffries, with their Federal Courts background, seem to put
more emphasis on it.60  Those who are making the transition,
as I did, from a Federal Courts to a Civil Rights course, might
find that Low and Jeffries eases that transition.6'
One interesting section of Low and Jeffries, not contained in
any of the other books, is a long chapter entitled, "Selected
Problems in Structural Reform Litigation. ' 62  Section 1983 has
been used as the vehicle to bring both damages actions (constitu-
tional torts) and suits for injunctive relief.63 The injunctive
suits sometimes ask for a simple remedy, such as enjoining an
unconstitutional statute or regulation.64 Such suits may also be
brought, however, to try to force structural reform of whole
government systems, such as schools, 65 prisons,66 or mental
hospitals. 67  This chapter focuses on some of the special prob-
lems inherent in such remedial litigation to a much greater extent
than the other texts.
59. Id. at 46.
60. The clearest example of this is their treatment of the federalism-based doctrine of
Younger Abstention (based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). They spend 82 pages on
it (Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at 638-720), compared with 35 for Eisenberg (supra note 2,
at 552-87), 37 for Abernathy (supra note 1, at 257-94) and none for Nahmod.
61. Low and Jeffries themselves refer to the two books as "companion volumes." Low &
JEFFRIES, supra note 3, at iv. Obviously, this transition factor would be even more persuasive for
those faculty who, like myself, used Low and Jeffries to teach Federal Courts.
62. Id. at 721-818.
63. The statute, by its terms, provides for "an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The first and most well-known case in which
the Supreme Court approved its use to obtain damages was Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
64. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
66. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
67. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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Nahmod, Wells and Eaton
As its name implies, Nahmod, Wells and Eaton's Constitu-
tional Torts deals only with Section 1983 suits for damages.
Although this book would not be useful for someone interested
in teaching other civil rights statutes or structural reform
litigation, its narrower focus makes it particularly suitable for a
Constitutional Torts class. I think such a class is not only
reasonable, but in some ways very attractive. Section 1983 cases
seeking damages raise very different issues from those seeking
injunctive relief, and certainly provide enough material for a one
semester course. In fact, my course comes very close to a
Constitutional Torts course, with only a few class hours on the
particular problems associated with injunctive relief.
The benefits of the narrower focus are not only a more man-
ageable amount of material for the students, but the ability to
include a significant number of Court of Appeals cases.
According to the authors, "[t]his enables students to see how
principles articulated in Supreme Court decisions are imple-
mented by lower courts."6 I think this approach makes a lot
of sense. I also like the straightforward way the material in this
book is organized and presented. There is enough textual
information to help the students understand the main cases, and
there are enough questions to get them to think about the
important issues, but not so much of either as to overwhelm
them.69 For years I have used Nahmod's wonderful treatise on
Section 1983 law7" as a personal resource, and even considered
using it as a class text. He has wisely imported the straightfor-
ward nature of the treatise into this casebook.
Earlier in this review, I mentioned that Low and Jeffries
might be suitable for a class requiring student papers, because
the in-depth notes provided significant resource material. I think
Nahmod, et al. may also be suitable for a paper or project
68. NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 5, at xv.
69. For example, in their presentation on absolute judicial immunity, they begin with two
pages of background and history (NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 233-35), then present the
main case of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 235-
38), and end with a short series of questions about Stump (id. at 238-39).
70. SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (2d ed. 1991).
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course, but for a different reason: its shorter length and
narrower focus might allow coverage of the substantive material
in less than a semester. This would allow time at the end for
student projects.
I have recently thought of changing the format of my course,
from a discussion class with a take-home exam at the end to
either a paper or workshop course where the students conduct all
or part of a simulated Section 1983 litigation. The problem with
these approaches, however, is that the material is so complex that
I feel that, until near the end of the semester, the students are
not prepared for these kinds of projects. Given the Nahmod et
al. casebook's narrower focus, shorter length, and more straight-
forward style, it might be reasonable to teach Nahmod et al. for
the first eight to ten weeks of the semester, and then have the
students use the rest of the time to write a paper or to participate
in some sort of simulated litigation experience.
AND IN CONCLUSION.. .
I really enjoy teaching a course in Civil Rights Litigation.
It allows me to combine my professional expertise in federal
courts and procedure with my personal interest in civil liberties.
I feel lucky to have four very good casebooks from which to
choose for this course. Right now, I am fairly happy using the
Abernathy casebook. But since I have never used Nahmod,
Wells and Eaton, I might give it a try, if I can overcome the
typical professorial inertia to stick with the same book from year
to year. I hope I have provided enough information to help
others who are, or will be, teaching Civil Rights Courses make
an informed choice among these four books.
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